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Working memory is a mental storage system that keeps task-relevant information 
accessible for a brief span of time, and it is strikingly limited. Its limits differ 
substantially across people but are assumed to be fixed for a given person. Here, we 
show that there is substantial variability in the quality of working memory 
representations within an individual. This variability can be explained neither by 
fluctuations in attention or arousal over time, nor by uneven distribution of a 
limited mental commodity. Variability of this sort is inconsistent with the 
assumptions of the standard cognitive models of working memory capacity, 
including both slot- and resource-based models, and so we propose a new framework 
for understanding the limitations of working memory: a stochastic process of 
degradation that plays out independently across memories. 
 
Introduction 
 
Working memory is critical to navigation, communication, problem solving, and other 
activities, but there are stark limits to how much we can remember
1-9. A goal of research 
on working memory is to describe these limitations and determine their source. 
Cognitive models typically explain the capacity of working memory by postulating a 
mental commodity that is divided among the items or events to be remembered 
1,3,5,9-12. 
A core assumption of these models is that the quality (“fidelity”, “uncertainty”) of 
memories is determined solely by the amount of the commodity that is allocated to 
each item, being otherwise fixed
1,5,10-13. Items receiving more of the commodity are 
better remembered. 
A common approach to measuring the capacity of visual working memory is 
through the use of simple behavioral tasks. In one such task, participants are asked to 
remember the colors of a set of colorful dots, and then, after some delay, to report the 
color of a dot selected at random (Figure 1) 
1,9. Error is recorded as the difference 
between the correct color and the reported color. The distribution of these errors is used to test models of memory. Standard models
1,5,10-13 assume that for each dot in the 
display, the participant is in one of two states, either remembering or forgetting. 
Importantly, these two states lead to different errors when the participant is asked to 
report the dot’s color: errors for a forgotten item are uniformly distributed on the color 
wheel, whereas errors for a remembered item cluster around the correct color, with a 
spread that depends on how well it was remembered. The standard models assume that 
the form of the error distribution for remembered items is a circular normal (von 
Mises) distribution, with a spread that can be fully characterized by a single number: its 
precision, here defined as the standard deviation, as per [
1].  
 
(Figure 1 here) 
 
 
It is possible to relax the assumption that the quality of memory is fixed, instead 
supposing that it varies within an individual. To determine whether such variability is 
present, we can inspect the shape of the error distribution. Critically, variability in the 
precision of memory within an individual leads to an error distribution that is more 
peaked than a circular normal distribution because it involves mixing error 
distributions that differ in precision but have the same mean (Figure 2). With sufficient 
data, it is possible to measure this peakedness to estimate the extent of high-order 
variability in the quality of memory within an individual. 
 
(Figure 2 here)  
Here, using variants of the behavioral task outlined above, we show that there is 
variability in the quality of working memory within an individual. This variability can 
be explained neither by fluctuations in attention or arousal over time, nor by uneven 
distribution of a limited mental commodity. We propose that a complete 
understanding of the capacity and architecture of working memory must consider both 
the allocation of a mental commodity and the stability of the information that is 
stored. 
 
Results 
 
Revealing variability in the quality of working memory 
Participants were asked to perform a working memory task using displays with 1, 3, or 
5 colorful dots (Figure 1). The standard fixed-precision model
1 and our variable-
precision model was fit to each participant's distribution of errors (see Experimental 
Procedures). Figure 3 overlays the maximum a posteriori fixed- and variable-precision 
models on a histogram of errors made by one of the participants, for each of three set 
sizes: 1, 3, and 5. The variable-precision model provided a better fit to the data for each 
participant at each set size. When the two models were compared using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), a measure of goodness of fit, we found lower AIC values 
for the variable-precision model for each participant at each set size (Supplementary 
Table S1); the average magnitude of these AIC differences (7, 11.3, and 12) is a decisive 
victory for the variable precision model, leaving the fixed precision model with “essentially no support” from the data
14. Furthermore, the amount of variation in 
memory precision increased with set size for each participant (Figure 4). The average 
precision across subjects was 11.6°, 17.4°, and 23.7° for set sizes 1, 3, and 5, 
respectively. The average standard deviation of precision, a measure of variability in 
memory quality, was 3.0°, 5.4°, and 8.9°. These results were obtained with a variable-
precision model in which the variability in precision was assumed to follow a truncated 
normal distribution. Evidence of variable quality was also found when substituting a 
gamma distribution over the inverse of the variance, similar to [
15] (average inverse 
variance .009°, .005°, .003°; average standard deviation of inverse variance, 2.3×10
–5, 
1.1×10
–5, 9.0×10
–6).  
 
 
(Figure 3 here) 
(Figure 4 here) 
 
 
Determining the source of the variability 
There are many possible sources of variability, including both true variability in 
memory precision as well as variability from other sources like perceptual noise, eye 
movements, and differences in the memorability of certain colors or locations. A series 
of control experiments were performed that demonstrate that these other sources made 
only a negligible contribution to the observed variability in memory quality.  
When the memory demands of the task were eliminated by keeping the stimulus 
present while the participant responded, variability was eliminated and the data were 
better fit by a fixed-precision model (Supplementary Table S2). Even when the average error on the perception task was increased to match that of the memory task 
(Supplementary Methods), variability was still three times smaller (2.2° vs. 8.9°, t(4) = 
3.86, p < .05, independent samples t-test).  
A further experiment showed that there were negligible differences in the 
memorability of different colors (Supplementary Methods). We measured the variation 
in precision for six color bins, each spanning 30° of the color wheel (0–30°, 60–90°, …, 
300–330°). Even though the range of colors within each bin was now only a small 
subset of the color wheel we still found substantial variability within a bin 
(Supplementary Figure 1). In fact, the variability within a bin was comparable to that in 
the full data set (Supplementary Figure 1c, one-sample t-tests, t(5)’s < .5, p’s > .65 for 
both participants). Furthermore, the variation in precision estimates across bins was 
minimal and accounts for at most a small (3.9%) portion of the total variance.  
Similarly, we tested whether performance differed depending on the location of the 
tested item, a possible contributor to the observed variability in memory. For both the 
three- and five-item displays, we found little variance in the estimated precision across 
locations (4.15° for 3-item displays, 3.24° for 5-item displays). (This is an upper bound 
on the contribution to variance because it includes measurement error.) Furthermore, 
the observed variance explains only 12.7% and 3.8% of the total variance for the 3-item 
and 5-item conditions, respectively.  
Representational quality could differ for items that are fixated compared to items 
that are not. The encoding duration used in Experiment 1 was long enough to allow 
for a saccade, therefore raising the possibility that variability in precision is due entirely to imbalances in encoding introduced by eye movements. We found that memories are 
variably precise even when eye movements are not possible. Two participants were 
asked to remember the color of three items presented for 100 ms. While this encoding 
duration is too short for an eye movement, we nonetheless found variability in the 
precision of working memory. Both participants’ data were better fit by the variable- 
than fixed-precision model (average difference in AICc values of 4.0 in favor of the 
variable-precision model).  
The previous manipulation eliminated the possibility of eye movements during 
stimulus presentation, but it does not address the possibility that gaze was not centered 
on fixation. We performed an additional follow-up experiment in which stimulus 
presentation was conditional on 1000 ms of continuous, uninterrupted fixation 
(Supplementary Methods). The data for two out of the three participants were better fit 
by the variable- than fixed-precision model, with an average difference in AICc of 6.7 in 
favor of the variable-precision model.  
 
There is variability between items within a trial 
In the following experiments, we show that this variability can be explained neither 
by state-based fluctuations in attention or arousal across trials
16, nor by the uneven 
allocation of a mental commodity within a trial. This pattern of results is not easily 
captured by models of working memory in which the quality of a memory is 
determined solely be the allocation of a finite commodity. In a new experiment, on half of the trials participants were given the opportunity to 
report the color of the item they remembered best. On the other half of the trials, they 
reported the color of an item that was selected for them at random. These two 
conditions were intermixed in random order. Note that only variability within a trial 
can contribute to the participant’s decision in this task. Therefore, if this variability is 
accessible to the participant, precision will be better for the best-remembered item than 
for one selected at random. This enables us to measure the extent to which the quality 
of memory varies within vs. across trials. 
When probed on a random item, the mean precision was 19.9 ± 1.2° (SEM) and its 
standard deviation was 6.2 ± 0.60° (Figure 5a). However, when given the opportunity 
to choose which item to report, the mean precision was better (15.4 ± .75°, paired 
samples t-test, t(9) = 5.3, p < .001) and less variable (4.4 ± .38°, t(9) = 3.4, p = .01) 
(Figure 5b).  
This outcome provides an existence proof of within-trial variability and implies that 
it is cognitively present and useful. But how much of the variation is contained within 
a trial, and how much of it is across trials? To answer this question, we ran simulations 
under conditions of purely within- and purely across-trial variability (Figure 5c; see 
Experimental Procedures). We did not find a difference between the observed 
distribution and the simulated distribution for purely within-trial variation, either in 
mean (15.4° observed vs. 15.5 ± 0.75° simulated; paired samples t-test, t(9) = .05, p > 
.85, ) or standard deviation (4.4° observed vs. 5.0° ± 0.41° simulated; t(9) = 1.21, p > 
.25), (Figure 5d). Nor did we find a difference in the mean or standard deviation of precision between the trials in which a random item was probed and trials in another 
control experiment, run with ten new participants, that did not include a “choose the 
best” condition (19.9° vs. 22.1 ± 1.18°, independent samples t-tests, t(18) = .91, p = .38; 
6.2° vs. 6.0 ± .74°, t(18) = .74, p = .48). This suggests that giving the participant the 
opportunity to choose the best remembered item on some trials did not alter how 
items were encoded on the other trials. 
 
(Figure 5 here) 
 
  In showing that nearly all of the variability in memory quality is accessible to 
the participant on a single trial, these results rule out a sizeable contribution of across-
trial variability in the present study and suggest near-perfect metamemory for the 
relative quality of working memory representations. These findings also speak to an 
alternative account of the results of the first experiment, where we found that the 
distribution of response error was more peaked than is predicted by standard fixed-
precision models
1,5,10-13. Is it possible that the distribution’s peaked shape arose not 
because of variability in precision, but because of a fixed-precision error distribution 
that is naturally more peaked than a circular normal distribution? The results of the 
current experiment make this alternative account unlikely because nearly all of the 
peakedness in the distribution of report error is accounted for by variability across 
items within a trial, suggesting that the peakedness of the error distribution reflects 
variability across items and leaving little reason to posit an additional source. 
 Variability in memory quality is independent across items 
Many theories hold that the quality of a memory is determined by the allocation of a 
finite commodity, where items receiving more of the commodity are better 
remembered 
1,3,5,9,12. These theories predict that some of the within-trial variation in 
precision can be accounted for by uneven allocation: when more of the commodity has 
been allocated to one item, less is available for the others, thereby producing tradeoffs 
between items within a display. To determine whether the variability we observed was 
due to uneven commodity allocation, we performed an experiment in which 
participants were asked to report the color of every item in the display. We then tested 
for tradeoffs by comparing the errors made for one item when the responses to another 
item was good versus bad (i.e., above versus below the median absolute error for that 
response across trials) (Figure 6). We found no difference in precision between above-
median and below-median splits for any combination of items, regardless of whether 
the estimates of precision were derived from the fixed-precision model (Figure 7a) 
(paired samples t-tests, all t(15)’s < 1.6 and all p’s > .1) or the variable-precision model 
(Figure 7b) (all t(15)’s < 1.2 and all p’s > .25).  
 
(Figure 6 here) 
(Figure 7 here) 
 
This evidence of independence is based on a null result. However, using Monte 
Carlo simulations we found that our tradeoff-detection method is powerful enough to 
reliably detect tradeoffs if they were to exist (Supplementary Note). We considered two sources of tradeoffs: (1) noiseless uneven allocation, where the participant knowingly 
attends or gives preferential processing to a chosen item, and (2) noisy even allocation, 
where the participant tries to distribute her resources evenly, but fails, unwittingly 
giving preference to some items over others. We found that any unevenness strong 
enough to produce the observed variability in precision would have been readily 
detected through our procedure for detecting tradeoffs (Supplementary Note). Finding 
independence of precision for items within a display
17,18 rules out that the observed 
variability in precision reflects unevenness in the allocation of discrete slots
1 or a graded 
resource
5.   
 
Discussion	 ﾠ
Visual working memory is not perfect. Its imperfections have been used to fashion 
cognitive models of visual working memory in which the quality of a memory is 
determined solely by the amount of a mental commodity that it receives. In contrast to 
the predictions of these models, the present results show that even under conditions of 
even allocation, the quality of working memory varies independently across trials and 
items. This finding is consistent with a stochastic process that degrades memory for 
each individual item and plays out independently across them. The outcome of this 
process leaves each memory in its own state, with its own precision, which when 
combined across items, produces the characteristic peaked shape of report-error 
distributions. Thus, visual working memory is stochastic both at the level of a memory’s 
content and at the level of its quality.   A physiological mechanism that might account for variability in the quality of 
working memory representations is cortical noise that impedes the sustained activation 
of the neural populations that code for the remembered information
5,12,19-23. The 
precision of memory representations may correspond to the amount of signal drift over 
time and the extent to which noisy signals are pooled within a neural population
1,5,9,20,24-
26. The recruitment of larger neural populations will improve the precision of working 
memory representations through decreased signal drift or increased redundancy in 
coding. Critically, the probability that neurons within a population will self-sustain 
after stimulus offset is known to be affected by internal noise
20-22. Under these 
circumstances, the precision of memory representations would be determined by the 
outcome of stochastic physiological processes operating independently across 
representations. 
Existing models explain the source of limitations in working memory solely by 
reference to a finite capacity for storing information. Here, we have shown that a 
complete account of visual working memory must also consider the stability of stored 
information. To put forward one model capable of producing variability of the sort 
described here, consider a finite mental commodity that must be divided amongst the 
items to be remembered. As in existing models, this information limit can be 
formalized as a set of N independent samples that are allocated to the items being 
remembered
1,9-12, with slots models setting N to approximately 3, and with continuous 
resource models considering the limit as N tends to infinity. Suppose that the samples 
are unstable and that each has some probability of surviving until the time of the test. This leads to variability in memory quality of a specific form: a binomial distribution of 
samples per item. This random process, known as the pure death process in studies of 
population genetics, is one of many possible random processes that might degrade 
memory. 
Our model includes a guess state, a catch-all for trials on which the participant 
guesses randomly, either because of lapses in memory or because of other hiccups such 
as blinks and slips of the hand. A recent paper
15 has suggested that allowing for 
variability in the quality of working memory obviates the need to include a guess state. 
Though we agree that there is risk of over-estimating the rate of guessing if variability is 
ignored, we found that even taking variability into account, a guess state still accounts 
for a sizeable proportion of trials [Supplementary Notes]. Moreover, the goal of the 
present work is not to argue that participants never guess, but to show that variability 
in the quality of working memory reflects a random process of degradation that plays 
out independently across memories.  
Models of working memory that are constrained by the known properties of the 
brain uniformly propose that the maintenance of working memory representations 
involves stochastic processes that operate at all levels of processing
21,27,28. Yet most 
cognitive models explain working memory solely by reference to the division of a 
mental commodity: a resource divided among stored items
1,3-5,9,10,12. In these models, 
the quality of a memory representation is deterministic and based solely on the amount 
of the commodity allocated to it. Demonstrating independent, stochastic variation in 
memory quality within an individual requires a new framework that includes a role for stochastic processes, helping to bridge the gap between biologically-plausible neural 
models on the one hand and cognitive models on the other.  
 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were between the ages of 18 and 28, had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, and received either $10/hour or course credit.  Participants whose testing ran 
over multiple days were given a bonus of $10 per session after the first. The studies 
were performed in accordance with Harvard University regulations and approved by 
the Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research under the Institutional 
Review Board for the Faculty of Arts & Sciences.  
 
Stimuli 
The stimulus was 1, 3, or 5 colorful dots arranged in a ring around a central fixation 
mark. The radius of each dot was 0.4° in visual angle and the radius of the ring was 
3.8°. Each dot was randomly assigned one of 180 equally-spaced equiluminant colors 
drawn from a circle (radius 59°) in the CIE L*a*b* color space, centered at L=54, a=18, 
b=–8. The grouping strength of the colors was controlled by transforming the color 
values to vectors in polar space, selecting displays with the constraint that the 
magnitude of the mean vector of each display was equal to that expected of a randomly-
sampled display. 
 Presentation 
Stimuli were rendered by a computer running MATLAB with the Psychophysics 
Toolbox
29,30. The display’s resolution was 1920 × 1200 at 60 Hz, with a pixel density of 
38 pixels/cm. The viewing distance was 60 cm. The background was gray, with a 
luminance of 45.4 cd/m
2. 
 
Procedure 
On each trial, the stimulus was presented for 600 ms and then removed. After a 900 
ms delay, a filled white circle appeared at the location of a randomly selected item and 
hollow circles appeared at the location of the other items. Participants were asked to 
report the probed item’s color by selecting it from a response screen with the full color 
wheel, 6.5° in radius, centered around fixation. A black indicator line was placed at the 
outer edge of the response wheel at the position closest to the cursor. Once the 
participants moved the mouse, the filled circle’s color was continuously updated to 
match the currently-selected color. Participants registered their choice by clicking a 
mouse. Responses were not speeded. Feedback was provided after each response by 
displaying onscreen the error in degrees. 
 
Experiment 1 Methods 
Three participants performed three sessions, each lasting 1.5–2 hours. Each session 
used 1, 3, or 5 items, and their order (and therefore set size) was counterbalanced 
across participants. There were 800 trials per session for set sizes 1 and 3 and 720 trials per session for set size 5.   
 
Experiment 2 Methods 
Ten participants performed two 700-trial sessions with a set size of 3. On half of the 
trials, participants reported the item they remembered best. On the other half, 
participants reported the color of a randomly selected item. Probe types were 
intermixed in random order. On “choose the best” trials, instructions appeared at the 
top of the screen telling participants to report a color and then to select the location of 
the best-remembered item by clicking its location. On these trials, filled white circles 
appeared at the locations of the probed and non-probed items. 
 
Experiment 3 Methods 
Sixteen participants performed one 500-trial session with a set size of 3. Instead of 
reporting only one item, participants were asked to report all three. Items were probed 
in random order. Feedback was given. Non-probed items, even those already reported, 
were indicated by hollow circles.  
 
Modeling the error distribution 
General framework 
All of the models considered here can be seen as special cases of an infinite scale mixture, 
a general framework that describes error distributions with a fixed mean and a precision (scale) that is sampled from some higher-order distribution, known as the 
“mixing distribution”. 
 
Fixed-precision model 
In the fixed-precision model, the participant is in one of two states for each item on the 
display. With probability 1–g, she remembers the item and has some fixed amount of 
information about it. Limited memory leads to errors in recall, which are assumed to 
be distributed according to a von Mises distribution (the circular analogue of a normal 
distribution) centered at zero (or, perhaps, with some bias µ) and with spread 
determined by a concentration parameter κ that reflects the memory’s precision. The 
mixing distribution is thus the Dirac delta function at κ, a distribution concentrated at 
that one point. With probability g, she remembers nothing about the item and guesses 
randomly, producing errors distributed according to a circular normal. Together, the 
probability density function of this model is given by 
 
where φ is the von Mises density, defined by 
, 
where I0 is the modified Bessel function of order zero. 
 
Variable-precision model 
f(x;g,µ,κ)=(g)
1
360
+(1−g)φ(x;µ,κ),
φ(x;µ,κ)=
e
κcos(x−µ)
360I0(κ)The variable-precision model is the same as the fixed-precision model, except that 
precision is distributed according to some higher-order distribution, e.g., a truncated 
normal or gamma distribution. Unless guided by a theory for the source of variability 
in precision, the choice of mixing distribution is arbitrary, but certain combinations of 
error distribution and mixing distribution are convenient. For example, when error is 
normally distributed about the correct value, and when precision (i.e., the inverse of 
variance) is gamma distributed, the resulting experimental data takes the form of a 
generalized Student’s t-distribution. (This result generalizes to the case of distributions 
wrapped on the circle, which is useful for representing colors and orientations.) For 
guess rate g, bias µ, and standard deviation σ, the probability density function of this 
model is given by 
 
where ψ is the wrapped generalized Student’s t-distribution
31 and is given by 
, 
 with  . 
Incorporating higher order variability into new models of working memory is therefore 
a simple matter of replacing the usual choice of error distribution, a von Mises 
distribution, with a wrapped generalized Student’s t distribution.  
Some combinations of error and mixing distributions give rise to named 
distributions with known analytic expressions 
32,33, but others, like the truncated 
normal mixing distribution, must be simulated. The mean precision and its standard 
f(x;µ,σ,g,υ)= (g)
1
360
+(1−g)ψ(x;µ,σ,υ),
ψ(x;µ,σ,υ)=
c
σ
1+
(x+360−µ)
2
σ
2υ
⎛
⎝
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⎞
⎠
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
−(v+1) 2
=−∞
∞
∑
c =Γ
v+1
2 ( ) Γ
υ
2 ( ) πυ ( )deviation were free parameters, bounded between 0° and 100°. (The upper bound is 
arbitrary, but standard deviations above 100° are typically indistinguishable from 
guesses anyways.) 
This should not be taken as a strong claim about the form of the distribution of 
memory precision, which will depend crucially on the process that degrades memories. 
However, no matter which distribution is chosen, the presence of variability produces a 
signature effect on the data — peakedness in the error distribution — seen most clearly 
in Figure 2, and which is readily detected using the present methods. 
 
Model fitting 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) was used to find the maximum a posteriori 
parameter set of a model given the errors on the memory task. Each model was fit 
separately for each subject and experimental condition. The data were not binned. We 
used the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, which takes a random walk over the parameter 
space, sampling locations in proportion to how well they describe the data and match 
prior beliefs. A non-informative Jeffreys prior was placed over each parameter. The 
proposal distribution used to recommend jumps was a multivariate Gaussian centered 
at the current parameter set, whose standard deviation was tuned during a burn-in 
period that ended when all of the chains, which started at different locations in the 
parameter space, converged. We collected 15,000 samples from these converged chains 
and report the sample with the maximum posterior probability.  
 Model comparison 
To compare the relative goodness of fit of the fixed- and variable-precision models, we 
computed each model’s Akaike information criterion, a measure that includes a 
penalty term for the number of free parameters 
34. For a model with k parameters and 
maximum log-likelihood L, the Akaike information criterion is given by 
  (1) 
Because this formulation of the AIC assumes infinite data, it is necessary to correct the 
value when estimating it from experimental data. The corrected AIC, AICc, is given by 
,            (2) 
where n is the sample size—i.e., the number of trials performed by a participant on the 
working memory task.  
 
Simulating across- and within-trial variation (Experiment 2) 
We performed Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the distribution of precision when 
‘choosing the best’ under conditions of purely across-trial variation or purely within-
trial variation. For each subject, 1,000 trials (of 3-item displays) were simulated 
according to that participant’s maximum a posteriori parameter values for the random 
probe condition. When assuming across-trial variation, the precision value for each 
trial was selected at random from one of the three randomly drawn precision values. 
Error was simulated by sampling from a von Mises distribution with the drawn 
precision value. For each participant, the resulting error distributions were fit with the 
AIC=−2L+2k
AICc = AIC+
2k(k+1)
n-k-1variable-precision model, yielding parameter estimates that matched the random probe 
data (mean 20.2° and SD 6.4°; comparable to Figure 5, red line). When assuming 
within-trial variation, we selected the best precision value from the three that were 
randomly sampled. These values were used to simulate error responses that were then 
fit with the variable precision model (Figure 5, blue line, mean 15.4° and SD 5.0°).  
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Competing financial interests: The authors declare no competing financial interests.Figure 1: Timeline of a working memory task. First, a display of colorful dots is briefly 
presented. This is followed by an interval during which the participant is asked to hold 
the colors in mind. Finally, a response screen appears. On the response screen, the 
position of a randomly sampled item is cued and the participant is asked to select the 
color of the item that was presented at that location. 
 
Figure 2: Fixed and variable-precision models produce different distributions of 
error. (a) Each curve shows the distribution of precision (the standard deviation of 
error on the memory task) for a different fixed-precision model. (b) A variable-precision 
model can be thought of as a higher-order distribution of fixed-precision models. One 
such higher-order distribution is shown here; it is a truncated normal with a mean of 
24° and a standard deviation of 7°, bounded at 0° and 100°. (c) Variable precision 
models have different distributions of error. The green line is the distribution of errors 
for a model whose precision is fixed at 24°. (The green distribution in panels a and c 
are the same.) The red line is the expected distribution of errors if precision were 
drawn from the full distribution in panel b. Mixing together distributions with 
different precision produces a peaked shape that is a hallmark of the variable-precision 
model. 
 
Figure 3: Distinguishing between models with fixed- and variable-precision. Each 
panel shows a histogram of errors on the working memory task and the best-fit fixed 
precision (green line) and variable-precision (red line) model. The working memory task 
used 1, 3, or 5 items (panels a, b, and c, respectively). These data are from a 
representative participant. 
 
Figure 4: Variability in the quality of working memory depends on the load. The 
estimated distribution of precision according to the best-fitting variable-precision model 
for set sizes 1 (red), 3 (green), and 5 (blue), for each of three subjects (panels a–c). The 
bars along the horizontal axis show the precision values of the best-fit fixed-precision 
models. 
 
Figure 5: Choosing the item that was remembered best. (a) When participants were 
asked to report an item selected at random, they made errors. (b) When allowed to 
report the item they remembered best, they performed better, seen as a narrower 
distribution of error. The ability to pick out the best-remembered item is evidence that 
the items differed in how well they were remembered. (c) Using the distribution in 
panel a, we simulated the distribution of errors that we would expect to find in panel b 
if participants had perfect metamemory, always picking out the best-remembered item. 
(d) The observed and simulated distributions of memory quality match, suggesting that 
participants have nearly perfect metamemory. 
 
Figure 6: Evidence that memory degradation is independent across items. 
Distributions of report error for the first, second, and third responses sorted by 
whether the response to another item in the trial was below (black) or above (gray, flipped) the median error. Memory quality does not differ between the two, which is 
evidence of memory degradation that is independent across items.  
 
Figure 7: Model fits for the data reported in Figure 6. (a) We separately fit a fixed-
precision model to the data from each participant, response (1st, 2nd, or 3rd), sorting, 
and split (above vs. below the median error). The best-fit standard deviation did not 
differ between the splits, which means that memory quality was comparable. (b) We did 
the same using the variable-precision model and found the same result: evidence of 
memory degradation that is independent across items. 